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Abstract    
This paper studies integration of regional goods markets in Russia over 2001–2015 with the 
use of time series analysis, based on the law of one price as the criterion of market 
integration. The cost of a staples basket is used as a price representative. The analysis 
involves all pairs of country’s regions, thus providing a comprehensive pattern of market 
integration. The region pairs are classified as belonging to one of four groups: integrated, 
conditionally integrated, not integrated but tending towards integration, and neither 
integrated nor tending towards integration. The results suggest that less than a half of region 
pairs fall into the fourth category.  
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1. Introduction 
Considering a product market of some country as a system of regional markets, the question arises 
as to how strong ties between elements of this system are. In economic terms, it sounds as how 
strongly regional markets are integrated with each other. Two forms of answer to this question are 
possible. The first is an aggregated characterization of the degree of spatial integration within the 
whole domestic market. The second is a characterization of spatial structure of integration which 
provides information on integration of each regional market with other ones. This makes it possible 
to reveal heterogeneity of regions from the viewpoint of market integration. This heterogeneity may 
be due to different extent of regional protectionism, remoteness of regions, and other factors. For 
example, Berkowitz and DeJong (1999) find a group of regions in Russia denoted as the Red Belt 
that has impeded market integration in the country in the 1990s because of antireform attitude of 
their governments. In China, it has come to interregional trade wars, as Young (2000) reports. 
There is no uniform definition of spatial market integration (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001; 
Barrett, 2008). The following definition is exploited in this paper. A set of regional markets for a 
(tradable) good is deemed integrated if there are no barriers to trade between regions, except for 
‘natural,’ geographically determined barriers, i.e. disconnectedness of regions (quantified by 
transportation costs). In the integrated market, goods arbitrage results in spatial equilibrium that 
manifests itself in the law of one price. In its strict form, when transportation costs may be neglected 
(if they are very small as compared to the price of the good or the price includes average 
transportation costs), the law states that the price of the same good should be equal across all 
regions. A weak version of the law takes account of ‘natural’ barriers to trade, allowing the price of 
the good to differ between two regions by no more than transportation costs (per unit of the good). 
Thus, the law of one price can be applied as the criterion of market integration.      
Testing for the law of one price in its strict or weak versions is a common exercise in studies 
of market integration. However, it overlooks an important transitional case. Despite the price differs 
between two regions, regional prices can converge to each other, eventually eliminating the price 
disparity. Thus, albeit this pair of regions is not integrated, it tends towards integration over time.  
This paper analyzes time series of the cost of a staples basket over 2001–2015 with a monthly 
frequency across all pairs of Russian regions, thus providing a comprehensive pattern of market 
integration in the country. The region pairs are classified as belonging to one of four groups. The 
first one consists of integrated pairs, i.e. those where the strict law of one price holds (perfect 
integration). The second group comprises conditionally integrated pairs, where the weak law of one 
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price holds (the next section explains why integration is deemed conditional in this case). The third 
group includes region pairs tending towards integration. Following a method put forward in 
Gluschenko (2011), the movement towards integration is modeled by a nonlinear asymptotically 
decaying trend of price disparity (however, unlike that paper, with the use of different modes of the 
trend). At last, the fourth group consists of neither integrated nor tending-towards-integration region 
pairs.  
A number of papers investigate spatial pattern of market integration in Russia, using different 
product and location samples as well as time spans. Gardner and Brooks (1994) study market 
integration in Russia in 1992–1993, using data for six food commodities across 14 cities in the 
Volga economic area. They pool time series for all pairs of cities into a data panels (separately for 
each commodity). This allows including time invariant variables such as distance, price regulations, 
etc., but yields results averaged across city pairs, hence an overly aggregated pattern of market 
integration (so that its spatial dimension disappears). Berkowitz et al. (1998) analyze time series of 
prices for five foods across 13 to 25 cities from the European part of Russia in 1992–1995. They do 
not address directly to the issue of market integration, focusing on the relationship between the 
behavior of prices of similar goods across cities, which provides an indirect indications of 
integration. Goodwin et al. (1999) consider prices for four goods across five cities of Russia during 
1993–1994, analyzing linkages of prices in each pair of cities with the use of cointegration, Granger 
causality, and impulse response techniques. They interpret the presence of the price linkages as 
evidence in favor of market integration. Gluschenko (2011) uses the cost of a staples basket relative 
to a benchmark region across almost all regions of Russia (represented by their capital cities) over 
1994–2000. Using time series analysis, regions are broken down into three groups: integrated with 
the benchmark region, tending towards integration with it, and neither integrated nor tending 
towards integration. Akhmedjonov and Lau (2012) deal with prices for four energy products in all 
Russian regions relative to the national average prices during 2003–2010. They focus on 
convergence of prices, using a nonlinear trend (the argument of which is the lag of the relative price 
rather than time) to model it. A similar methodology is applied in Lau and Akhmedjonov (2012), 
where convergence of aggregated (relative) prices for outer clothing across 44 regions of Russia for 
2002–2009 is explored. This paper contributes to the above literature, providing a spatial pattern of 
market integration in Russia that involves all pairs of country’s regions. (To my knowledge, such a 
work was not done as yet for any country with a significant number of regions.) In some respect, it 
supplements results of Gluschenko (2011), extending them to the 2000s.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 expounds methodology applied. 
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In Section 3, empirical data used for the analysis are described .Section 4 reports and discusses the 
estimation results. Section 5 compares results obtained with those for 1994–2000. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
Let prt and pst be prices for a tradable good in regions r and s (r, s = 1,…, N) at period t, Prst = 
log(prt/pst) being the price differential;. The economic model of the strict law of one price looks like 
Prst = 0 for t = 0,…, T and a region pair (r, s). Certainly, the law can hold only statistically in reality, 
accurate to random shocks νt  (to economize notation, the region indices for disturbances and 
parameters are suppressed). It is natural to suppose the prices (hence, the price differential) to 
depend on their previous values, i.e. to be autocorrelated. Then the econometric model of the strict 
law of one price has the form Prst = νt, νt = (λ + 1)νt-1 + εt, where λ + 1 = ρ is the autoregression 
coefficient, and εt is the Gaussian white noise. Substituting the second equation into the first gives 
the conventional AR(1) model with no constant (ΔPrst stands for the first difference, ΔPrst ≡ Prst – 
Prs,t–1; hereafter, t = 1,…,T): 
ΔPrst = λPrs,t–1 + εt.           (1) 
The law of one price holds if time series Prst is stationary (contains no unit root). In this case, 
regions r and s are deemed perfectly integrated with each other. 
The weak law of one price can be modeled as Prst = Crs, where Crs represents time-
invariant arbitrage transaction costs. (Note that different versions of the model are possible, e.g. 
C(-)rs ≤ Prst ≤ C(+)rs, leading to threshold econometric models). Based on the same considerations 
as above, we get the conventional AR(1) model with constant γ = –λCrs: 
ΔPrst = γ + λPrs,t–1 + εt.          (2) 
The weak law of one price holds if time series Prst is stationary about a nonzero constant. In 
such an event, regions r and s are deemed conditionally integrated with each other. They could be 
acknowledged as integrated on condition that the price disparity Crs is due to transportation costs 
only. However, it can include also effects or ‘artificial’ impediments to integration, such as regional 
protectionism, local price regulations, organized crime, etc. In the framework of time series analysis, 
it is impossible to reveal the nature of Crs; therefore the term ‘conditional integration’ is applied.  
The movement towards integration (price convergence) can be modeled by an asymptotically 
decaying trend: Prst = Crs(t), where Crs(t) → 0 as t → ∞, and sign(Crs(0))⋅dCrs(t)/dt < 0. This 
relationship is close to the definition of convergence suggested by Bernard and Durlauf (1995). 
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Taking account of autocorrelation, we get an AR(1) model of the form  
ΔPrst = Crs(t) – (λ + 1)Crs(t – 1) + λPrs,t–1 + εt.       (3) 
This study uses three modes of the trend. The first is the log-exponential trend C(t) = log(1 + 
γeδt), δ < 0; the second is the exponential trend C(t) = γeδt, δ < 0; and the third is the fractional trend 
t
tC δ
γ
+= 1)( , δ > 0. The respective nonlinear models have the forms 
ΔPrst = log(1 +γeδt) – (λ + 1)log(1 + γeδ(t – 1)) + λPrs,t–1 + εt;     (3a) 
ΔPrst = γeδt – (λ + 1)γeδ(t – 1) + λPrs,t–1 + εt;       (3b) 
ttrsrst Ptt
P ελδ
γλδ
γ ++−++−+=Δ −1,)1(1)1(1 .      (3c) 
Price convergence takes place if time series Prst is stationary around one or more of these 
trends and parameter δ has the expected (for the given trend) sign. Then regions in the pair (r, s) are 
deemed to move towards integration with each other. Incorrect sign of δ implies price divergence, 
hence the respective region pair is deemed non-integrated (and diverging). 
If no one of the Models (1)–(3) describes the behavior of prices in region pair (r, s), these 
regions are deemed neither integrated nor tending towards integration with each other (hereafter, 
simply non-integrated for brevity). 
A problem in exploring spatial market integration is a great number of region pairs, equaling 
N(N – 1)/2. For instance, 79 Russian regions produce 3081 pairs. There are a few ways to reduce 
dimensionality. The first is to pool time series of all region pairs into a data panel, estimating only 
one panel regression, as, e.g., Gardner and Brooks (1994) do. However, this yields only a 
characterization of the whole country’s market with no geographical dimension. Another way is to 
use some region as a benchmark, i.e. to fix some region index, say, s in regressions (1)–(3), as, e.g., 
in Gluschenko (2011). Then the number of pairs reduces to N – 1. Seemingly, this way would 
provide a comprehensive spatial pattern of integration, since only N – 1 of all pairs are independent, 
making it possible to generate a time series for any other region pair, e.g., Pqrt = Pqst – Prst = log(pqt) 
– log(pst) – (log(prt) – log(pst)). But, unfortunately, autocorrelation of time series leads to non-
transitivity of statistical inference. For instance, if region pairs (q, s) and (r, s) are integrated, i.e. 
each satisfy Equation (1), this does not imply that pair (q, r) is also integrated. And vice versa, 
despite Pqst and Prst are unit root processes (random walks), Pqrt may manifest regularity of form 
(1)–(3). Thus, we have only a partial spatial pattern, which shows the state of integration with the 
benchmark region, but is silent as to integration of other region pairs. A consequence is that the 
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pattern obtained crucially depends on the choice of benchmark region. One more way is to use the 
national market as the benchmark. In this case, the national price (a weighted average of regional 
prices) serves as the numeraire, like, e.g., in Akhmedjonov and Lau (2012). Here, the same problem 
of non-transitivity as above arises. Besides, this way is questionable from the econometrical 
viewpoint, since price differentials involve a mixture of all regional prices. Some of them could be 
unit root processes, spoiling the whole pattern of market integration.  
Thus, the existing ways of reducing the number of pairs do not provide a comprehensive 
pattern of market integration. Therefore regressions (1)–(3) are estimated and tested separately for 
each region pair (r, s).  
To test for a unit root (i.e. to test the hypothesis λ = 0 against λ < 0), the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test and Plillips-Perron test are applied. The hypothesis of non-stationarity is deemed rejected 
if both tests reject it at the level of 10%. (For technical details of testing, see Appendix). The 10% 
significance level is also applied to parameters γ and δ. All three versions of Model (3) are estimated 
for each region pair. If they turn out to be completive, the model providing the best fit – namely, the 
minimal sum of squared residuals – is accepted.  
Not infrequently, a time series Prst satisfies more than one model from their set (1)–(3). Then 
the ‘most proper’ model is to be selected. Two approaches are possible, general to specific and 
specific to general. The general model in this set is Model (3). It encompasses the rest models: 
imposing restriction δ = 0 on C(t), we get Equation (2), and γ = 0 produces Equation (1). Then the 
analysis of a time series goes from the general Equation (3) to Equation (2) and then to (1), 
accepting the first significant model in this sequence.  
Albeit the general-to-specific approach seems attractive from the theoretical point of view, this 
study applies the specific-to-general approach (which implies the reverse sequence), based on the 
following intuitive considerations. If a time series satisfies both Equations (1) and (2), it is 
reasonable to assume that although constant γ in Equation (2) is statistically significant, it is small 
and is caused by some accidental reasons (being a statistical artifact) rather than by properties of the 
process itself. Hence, it is logical to accept Model (1). Similarly, when a time series satisfies both 
Equations (2) and (3), the reason is a very weak trend, maybe, incidentally manifesting itself in the 
data. Hence, the model without trend, Equation (2), should be accepted. A random inspection of 
some such cases has confirmed these assumptions.   
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3. Data 
The Russian Federation consists of constituent units (republics, oblasts, one autonomous oblast, 
krais, autonomous okrugs, and federal cities) termed federal subjects. Despite different designations, 
all these are equal in legal terms. There is a curious feature of the political division of Russia, 
‘composite’ federal subjects, namely, oblasts or krais that include one or more other federal 
subjects, autonomous okrugs. (The Chukchi Autonomous Okrug is the only one that is not a part of 
another federal subject.) Within the time span under consideration, the autonomous okrugs have 
been merging with the oblasts/krais that include them, ceasing to be separate federal subjects (by 
now, only two ‘composite’ federal subjects remain).  
In this study, by a region is meant a federal subject (including federal cities of Moscow and 
Saint Petersburg); however, the composite federal subjects are considered as single regions (namely, 
the Arkhangelsk, Tyumen, and Irkutsk oblasts, and the Transbaikal and Kamchatke krais). The 
spatial sample for the analysis covers 79 regions, all Russia’s regions but the Chechen Republic, 
where full data on prices are lacking. They generate 3081 region pairs. 
An aggregated market for 33 basic foods (staples) is considered, using the cost of a basket of 
these goods as a price representative for the analysis. Rosstat (2005, Appendix 6)1 reports the 
composition of the basket. The analysis covers January 2001 through December 2015 with a 
monthly frequency (180 time observations). The price data are drawn from the Integrated 
Interagency Informational and Statistical System of Russia (EMISS), 
https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/31481.do.       
Figure 1 reports summary statistics – the mean and standard deviation – of the price 
differentials over the time span under consideration. The sign of the price differential depends on the 
order of regions in their pair; therefore a rearrangement of region indexes can change the summary 
statistics. To avoid this effect, the summary statistics are computed for the absolute values of the 
price differentials, ⎪Prst⎪.  
 
                                                          
1 Available on http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/prices/potr/PRIL6.DOC 
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Figure 1. Summary statistics of absolute price differentials. 
 
Statistics depicted in Figure 1 give an idea of price dispersion in the Russian spatial market. 
As it is seen, the price dispersion is highly volatile with dramatic fluctuations; the maximum to 
minimum ratio equals about 1.5 for both mean and standard deviation. This is due to relatively high 
inflation that greatly differs across regions. On average, monthly inflation rate over 2001–2015 was 
0.85% (10.7% per year), varying across regions from 0.71% to 0.96% (8.9% to 12.1% per year). 
Over time, the mean of the absolute price differential tends to increase, while its standard deviation 
tends to decrease. Assuming a linear trend, the former rises by 0.8% per year, and the latter falls by 
0.6% per year. Thus, it can be concluded that the process of spatial market integration in Russia is 
not completed. It is still in transition; both price convergence and divergence are going on in some 
spatial parts of the market. This makes analyzing only the state of integration with models of the 
form (1) or/and (2) insufficient, which motivates the use of modeling the movement to integration.  
 
4. Empirical results  
Before presenting full results, it is instructive to look at an example of specific region pairs 
belonging to each of four groups: perfectly integrated, conditionally integrated, tending towards 
integration, and non-integrated. Figure 2 illustrates these, depicting the actual evolution of the price 
differentials vs. their theoretical long-run paths. No long-run path exists for the non-integrated pair, 
Figure 2d.  
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(Omsk Oblast – Altai Krai) 
Figure 2. Examples of four types of region pairs. 
 
Figure 2 clarifies econometric considerations in the previous section. Equation (1) holds for 
the pair of integrated regions, Figure 2a. The price differential fluctuates around the price parity line 
P* = 0; that is, prices in these regions continually tend to equalize with each other. The conditionally 
integrated pair in Figure 2b satisfies Equation (2). Here, the price differential fluctuates around some 
nonzero constant. This means that prices in these regions tend to maintain a constant price disparity, 
14.4% (on average) in real terms. Regions in Figure 2c are moving to integration with each other. 
This pair satisfies Equation (3b) with trend C(t) = 0.273e–0.01t. Over time, the price differential 
diminishes, approaching the parity. Certainly, this does not imply that it necessarily will reach the 
parity. It is possible that beyond the time span under consideration the price differential will come to 
some equilibrium disparity. At last, no one model describes the behavior of price differential in 
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Figure 2d. It is interestingly to note that while the Altai Krai is perfectly integrated with the Oryol 
Oblast and not integrated with the Omsk Oblast, the Oryol and Omsk oblasts are conditionally 
integrated with each other, having P* = 0.035 that corresponds to a 3.6% price disparity in real 
terms. 
Table 1 tabulates the results of analysis across all region pairs in a summarized form. For each 
region, it reports percentage of the rest 78 regions with which the given region is perfectly 
integrated, conditionally integrated, tending towards integration, and not integrated (and not tending 
towards integration). In the last case, non-integration can be caused by price divergence, which 
manifests itself in a positive trend factor in trends (3a) and (3b) or negative factor in trend (3c). The 
percentage of such cases is also reported. In fact, the actual cases of divergence may be greater, as 
trends of the form (3a)–(3c) cannot cross zero by construction. Therefore Equation (3) cannot detect 
divergence with a trend crossing zero. The last line in the table reports the total percentage of 
respective region pairs (among all 3081 pairs). 
 
Table 1. Results of the analysis: the pattern of Russia’s market integration (in percentage terms) 
 
Region Integrated with Conditionally 
integrated with
Tending 
towards 
integration 
with 
Not integrated 
with 
Diverging with
1. Rep. of Karelia 15.4 50.0 2.6 32.1 3.8 
2. Rep. of Komi  14.1 38.5 2.6 44.9 6.4 
3. Arkhangelsk Obl. 15.4 16.7 2.6 65.4 17.9 
4. Vologda Obl. 17.9 25.6 1.3 55.1 7.7 
5. Murmansk Obl. 7.7 35.9 5.1 51.3 1.3 
6. St. Petersburg City 12.8 30.8 3.8 52.6 9.0 
  7. Leningrad Obl. 20.5 46.2 5.1 28.2 12.8 
  8. Novgorod Obl. 28.2 34.6 1.3 35.9 6.4 
  9. Pskov Obl. 19.2 9.0 9.0 62.8 29.5 
10. Kaliningrad Obl. 16.7 32.1 2.6 48.7 1.3 
11. Bryansk Obl. 25.6 23.1 2.6 48.7 5.1 
12. Vladimir Obl. 28.2 19.2 3.8 48.7 5.1 
13. Ivanovo Obl. 23.1 16.7 3.8 56.4 3.8 
14. Kaluga Obl. 20.5 14.1 7.7 57.7 11.5 
15. Kostroma Obl. 42.3 33.3 0.0 24.4 10.3 
16. Moscow City 10.3 10.3 16.7 62.8 1.3 
17. Moscow Obl. 19.2 25.6 7.7 47.4 5.1 
18. Oryol Obl. 34.6 28.2 5.1 32.1 6.4 
19. Ryazan Obl. 29.5 25.6 0.0 44.9 15.4 
20. Smolensk Obl. 20.5 30.8 2.6 46.2 10.3 
21. Tver Obl. 20.5 24.4 1.3 53.8 6.4 
22. Tula Obl. 25.6 19.2 3.8 51.3 7.7 
23. Yaroslavl Obl. 19.2 20.5 3.8 56.4 15.4 
24. Rep. of Mariy El  23.1 35.9 1.3 39.7 6.4 
25. Rep. of Mordovia 25.6 28.2 1.3 44.9 17.9 
26. Chuvash Rep.  17.9 39.7 2.6 39.7 5.1 
27. Kirov Obl. 29.5 24.4 1.3 44.9 15.4 
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Region Integrated with Conditionally 
integrated with
Tending 
towards 
integration 
with 
Not integrated 
with 
Diverging with
28. Nizhni Novgorod Obl. 24.4 29.5 0.0 46.2 14.1 
29. Belgorod Obl. 24.4 30.8 1.3 43.6 17.9 
30. Voronezh Obl. 46.2 25.6 0.0 28.2 10.3 
31. Kursk Obl. 6.4 3.8 0.0 89.7 26.9 
32. Lipetsk Obl. 11.5 35.9 0.0 52.6 19.2 
33. Tambov Obl. 15.4 33.3 6.4 44.9 7.7 
34. Rep. of Kalmykia  17.9 11.5 7.7 62.8 0.0 
35. Rep. of Tatarstan  20.5 23.1 3.8 52.6 1.3 
36. Astrakhan Obl. 20.5 15.4 2.6 61.5 10.3 
37. Volgograd Obl. 25.6 26.9 2.6 44.9 7.7 
38. Penza Obl. 19.2 25.6 0.0 55.1 17.9 
39. Samara Obl. 20.5 11.5 10.3 57.7 6.4 
40. Saratov Obl. 15.4 7.7 0.0 76.9 7.7 
41. Ulyanovsk Obl. 21.8 24.4 0.0 53.8 9.0 
42. Rep. of Adygeya  26.9 14.1 1.3 57.7 7.7 
43. Rep. of Dagestan 12.8 10.3 9.0 67.9 7.7 
44. Rep. of Ingushetia 57.7 30.8 1.3 10.3 3.8 
45. Kabardian-Balkar Rep.  28.2 24.4 1.3 46.2 7.7 
46. Karachaev-Cirkassian Rep. 32.1 21.8 3.8 42.3 6.4 
47. Rep. of Northern Ossetia  17.9 16.7 6.4 59.0 5.1 
48. Krasnodar Krai 21.8 24.4 0.0 53.8 9.0 
49. Stavropol Krai 24.4 23.1 1.3 51.3 7.7 
50. Rostov Obl. 28.2 20.5 2.6 48.7 3.8 
51. Rep. of Bashkortostan  23.1 32.1 3.8 41.0 2.6 
52. Udmurt Rep.  33.3 28.2 1.3 37.2 5.1 
53. Kurgan Obl. 30.8 30.8 7.7 30.8 3.8 
54. Orenburg Obl. 23.1 33.3 1.3 42.3 3.8 
55. Perm Krai 32.1 41.0 2.6 24.4 2.6 
56. Sverdlovsk Obl. 20.5 33.3 3.8 42.3 9.0 
57. Chelyabinsk Obl. 39.7 35.9 5.1 19.2 3.8 
58. Rep. of Altai 15.4 19.2 3.8 61.5 21.8 
59. Altai Krai 34.6 30.8 14.1 20.5 1.3 
60. Kemerovo Obl. 44.9 28.2 3.8 23.1 6.4 
61. Novosibirsk Obl. 20.5 17.9 6.4 55.1 19.2 
62. Omsk Obl. 26.9 43.6 1.3 28.2 10.3 
63. Tomsk Obl. 29.5 33.3 2.6 34.6 10.3 
64. Tyumen Obl. 10.3 42.3 21.8 25.6 2.6 
65. Rep. of Buryatia 32.1 30.8 0.0 37.2 2.6 
66. Rep. of Tuva  33.3 42.3 3.8 20.5 1.3 
67. Rep. of Khakasia  33.3 29.5 3.8 33.3 6.4 
68. Krasnoyarsk Krai 17.9 41.0 3.8 37.2 2.6 
69. Irkutsk Obl. 34.6 50.0 2.6 12.8 9.0 
70. Transbaikal Krai 30.8 55.1 2.6 11.5 5.1 
61. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)  0.0 62.8 3.8 33.3 14.1 
72. Jewish Autonomous Obl. 9.0 41.0 3.8 46.2 7.7 
73. Chukotka A.O. 0.0 44.9 26.9 28.2 0.0 
74. Primorsky Krai 1.3 17.9 2.6 78.2 41.0 
75. Khabarovsk Krai 1.3 20.5 2.6 75.6 57.7 
76. Amur Obl. 14.1 23.1 1.3 61.5 24.4 
77. Kamchatka Krai 1.3 55.1 26.9 16.7 0.0 
78. Magadan Obl. 1.3 43.6 1.3 53.8 29.5 
79. Sakhalin Obl. 0.0 34.6 5.1 60.3 2.6 
Total 21.7 28.8 4.2 45.3 9.7 
Obl. = Oblast, Rep. = Republic, and A.O. = Autonomous Okrug.  
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Among all region pairs, 51% are integrated or conditionally integrated. Adding pairs tending 
towards integration, we get the total of 55%. Unfortunately, there is no possibility to immediately 
compare these results with other countries, since a similar analysis has not been performed so far for 
any country. An indirect comparison can be done with results in Ceglowski (2003), who applies a 
model of form (2) to analyze prices for 45 individual goods across 25 cities in Canada (using Ottawa 
as a benchmark city). Averaging results reported in Ceglowski (2003, Table 2) over all covered 
goods, the percentage of cities integrated and conditionally integrated with Ottawa equals 55%. 
Based on this figure, it seems that the state of spatial market integration in Russia can be deemed 
more or less satisfactory. There is one more consideration in favor of such a conclusion. This study 
uses a ‘tough’ strategy of unit root testing (see Appendix). Be a ‘softer’ strategy applied (like that in 
Ceglowski, 2003, or Gluschenko, 2011), the proportion of perfectly and conditionally integrated 
region pair would equal 71.4% (with pair tending towards integration, 76.2%; see the next section).  
Given long distances between many regions of Russia and supposing that constant price 
disparities are due to transportation costs only, it is reasonable to expect that conditional integration 
would prevail. This is, indeed, the case; the number of conditionally integrated region pairs is 
greater by the factor of 1.3 than the number of perfectly integrated ones. Figure 3 plots distributions 
of the degree of perfect integration (left panel) and degree of both perfect and conditional integration 
in total (right panel) in the form of histograms. The degree of perfect integration and the like is the 
percentage of regions that are perfectly integrated (and the like) with a given one. Herefrom, [x, y) is 
the interval within which a percentage, Z, lies: x ≤ Z < y.  
 
0
5
10
15
20
[0
, 5
)
[5
, 1
0)
[1
0,
 1
5)
[1
5,
 2
0)
[2
0,
 2
5)
[2
5,
 3
0)
[3
0,
 3
5)
[3
5,
40
)
[4
0,
 4
5)
[4
5,
 5
0)
[5
0,
 5
5)
[5
5,
 6
0)
Integrated with, % of 78
R
el
at
iv
e 
fre
qu
en
cy
, %
0
5
10
15
20
[0
, 5
)
[5
, 1
0)
[1
0,
 1
5)
[1
5,
 2
0)
[2
0,
 2
5)
[2
5,
 3
0)
[3
0,
 3
5)
[3
5,
40
)
[4
0,
 4
5)
[4
5,
 5
0)
[5
0,
 5
5)
[5
5,
 6
0)
[6
0,
 6
5)
[6
5,
 7
0)
[7
0,
 7
5)
[7
5,
 8
0)
[8
0,
 8
5)
[8
5-
90
)
Integrated and conditionally integrated with, % of 78
R
el
at
iv
e 
fre
qu
en
cy
, %
Figure 3. Distributions of the degree of perfect integration and degree of both perfect and 
conditional integration. 
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The histogram bar [0, 5) in the left panel of Figure 3 suggests that there are 8.9% of regions (7 
regions of 78) perfectly integrated with less than 5% of other regions. Among them, three regions 
are perfectly integrated with none other region. The most frequent case is perfect integration with 
20% to 25% of other regions; there are 22.8% of such cases. No one region is perfectly integrated 
with more that 60% (exactly, 57.7%) of other regions. Turning to the sum of perfectly and 
conditionally integrated regions (the right panel of Figure 3), the ‘worst’ case is 10% to 15%; hence 
there are no regions without conditional integration with other ones. The maximum is 88.5%. Note 
that each region is herein taken twice, in pairs (r, s) and (s, r). That is why this figure exceeds the 
total percentage of perfectly and conditionally integrated pairs in Table 1. Specific regions that 
determine the left-most and right-most bars in these and next histograms will be specified below. 
Processes of price convergence, i.e. the movement towards integration, do take place in the 
Russian market. However, they are rather rare, occurring only in 4.2% of region pairs. Figure 4 plots 
distribution of the degree of tending towards integration. The most cases are concentrated in the 
range of 0 to 5%, making up 74.5%. Of them, cases of no convergence give14.1%; price 
convergence with one region gives 20.5%.  
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Figure 4. Distribution of the degree of tending towards integration. 
 
The left panel of Figure 5 plots the distribution of the degree of non-integration. (Recall that 
non-integration means here that a region pair not only is not integrated, perfectly or conditionally, 
but also does not tend towards integration.) There are no regions with this degree less than 10%. The 
range of the degree of non-integration is very wide, running to 89.7%.   
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Figure 5. Distributions of the degree of non-integration and degree of divergence. 
 
An unpleasant feature of non-integration is a significant proportion of price divergence. As 
mentioned above, the number of cases of divergence actually may be more, since only those are 
detected that satisfy Equation (3) with ‘incorrect’ sign of estimated parameter δ. The cases of 
divergence are more than twice as much as the cases of convergence. Price divergence is responsible 
for 21.4% of non-integration. The right panel of Figure 5 plots the distribution of the degree of 
divergence. Only three regions diverge with no one other. The most frequent case is price 
divergence with 5% to 10% of regions; it occurs in 39.2% of regions. A third of regions (33%) 
diverge with a greater number of other regions, up to 57.7% of them. Although, only two regions 
diverge with more than 30% of other ones.  
Figure 6 relates the results to geography, mapping ‘integration rates’ of regions, that is, the 
total percentage (as a range) of regions with which a given region is perfectly and conditionally 
integrated and tends towards integration. Note that the ‘integration rate’ is reverse to the degree of 
non-integration (column “Not integrated with” in Table 1 and the left panel of Figure 5), equaling 
100% minus this degree.  
The European part of Russia comprises 57 regions westward from the Tyumen Oblast 
(numbered as 64); the rest – 22 regions – is the Asian part of the country. In turn, it consists of 
Siberia and the Russian Far East. Siberia comprises regions from the Tyumen Oblast (including it) 
eastward up to the western border of Yakutia (region 71) and the Amur Oblast (region 76). Regions 
to the east of this border belong to the Russian Far East. 
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Figure 6. Geography of market integration in Russia: ‘integration rates’ of country’s regions.  
See Table 1 for numerical designations of regions. 
 
 16
Taking a look at the map, some unexpected features are seen. Given much shorter distances 
and more developed transport infrastructure in the European part of Russia than in its Asian part, 
one would a priory expect the former to be more strongly integrated than the latter. However, a 
significant number of poorly integrated regions are present in the European part. Except for the 
northern Arkhangelsk Oblast (region 3), the rest cases can be hardly explained by geographical 
reasons. At the same time, integration in Siberia is fairly strong. There is a sole region with the 
‘integration rate’ below 40% (the Republic of Altai, region 58). The rest regions – except for the 
Novosibirsk Oblast (region 61) – range between 65.4% and 79.5%. Poor integration of Far Eastern 
regions is quite expectable. Surprisingly, one of the most remote and difficult-to-access regions, 
Kamchatka (region 77) has ‘integration rates’ of 83.3%.     
Table 2 lists the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ regions with respect to different aspects of market 
integration. Values are expressed in percentage (of 78 regions). 
 
Table 2. Ranking of regions by different indicators of market integration (percentages)  
 
The most integrated region Perfectly integrated 
with 
The least integrated region Perfectly integrated 
with 
44. Rep. of Ingushetia 57.7 61. Rep. of Sakha (Yakutia)  0 
30. Voronezh Obl. 46.2 73. Chukotka A.O. 0 
60. Kemerovo Obl. 44.9 79. Sakhalin Obl. 0 
15. Kostroma Obl. 42.3 74. Primorsky Krai 1.3 
57. Chelyabinsk Obl. 39.7 75. Khabarovsk Krai 1.3 
  77. Kamchatka Krai 1.3 
  78. Magadan Obl. 1.3 
The most integrated and 
conditionally-integrated region 
Perfectly and 
conditionally 
integrated with 
The least integrated and 
conditionally-integrated region 
Perfectly and 
conditionally 
integrated with 
44. Rep. of Ingushetia 88.5 31. Kursk Obl. 10.3 
70. Transbaikal Krai 85.9 74. Primorsky Krai 19.2 
69. Irkutsk Obl. 84.6 16. Moscow City 20.5 
15. Kostroma Obl. 75.6 75. Khabarovsk Krai 21.8 
57. Chelyabinsk Obl. 75.6 40. Saratov Obl 23.1 
66. Rep. of Tuva 75.6 43. Rep. of Dagestan 23.1 
The least non-integrated region Not integrated with The most non-integrated region Not integrated with 
44. Rep. of Ingushetia 10.3 31. Kursk Obl. 89.7 
70. Transbaikal Krai 11.5 74. Primorsky Krai 78.2 
69. Irkutsk Obl. 12.8 40. Saratov Obl 76.9 
77. Kamchatka Krai 16.7 75. Khabarovsk Krai 75.6 
57. Chelyabinsk Obl. 19.2 43. Rep. of Dagestan 67.9 
Obl. = Oblast, Rep. = Republic, and A.O. = Autonomous Okrug. 
The data in the upper panel of Table 2 look reasonable. Regarding its left part, the most 
integrated regions are from the European part of Russia, except for the Kemerovo Oblast from 
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Siberia. The rightmost histogram bar in the left panel of Figure 3 is due to Ingushetia; the next four 
regions form the three preceding bars. As for the least integrated regions, all they are remote Far 
Eastern regions; hence, perfect integration can hardly occur there. It is these seven regions that form 
the leftmost histogram bar in the left panel of Figure 3. 
The first two regions in the left part of the middle panel of Table 2 form the rightmost 
histogram bar in the right panel of Figure 3. Interestingly, one of them (the Transbaikal Krai) is a 
Far Eastern region. There are also two Siberian regions in the list. Thus, a half of regions perfectly 
or conditionally integrated with the most number of other regions are from the Asian part of Russia. 
Turning to the right part of this panel, the presence of Far Eastern regions (the Primorsky and 
Khabarovsk krais) looks reasonable. However, four regions here are from the European part of the 
country. The ‘worst’ is the Kursk Oblast (the leftmost histogram bar in the right panel of Figure 3 is 
due to it only). As for the Moscow, its market is known for many and varied impediments to access 
to it, at least in the early 2000s. 
The lower panel of Table 2 deals with the absence of perfect and conditional integration as 
well as the movement to integration, which is reverse to the ‘integration rate.’ The first three regions 
from this list form the leftmost histogram bar in the left panel of Figure 5. The ‘worst’ regions in the 
right part of the lower panel of Table 2 are the same as in its middle panel. Moscow is not present 
here because of convergence with 16.7% of regions. No one case of price convergence with other 
regions is observed in the Kursk and Saratov oblasts (it is the Kursk Oblast that forms the rightmost 
histogram bar in the left panel of Figure 5). Convergence with two regions occurs in the Khabarovsk 
and Primorsky krais. The Republic of Dagestan converges with seven regions. Contrastingly, price 
divergence is widespread among these regions; three of them diverge with 26.9% to 57.7% of other 
regions. The Khabarovsk Krai forms the rightmost histogram bar in the right panel of Figure 4, 
diverging with more than a half of regions. 
 
5. 2001–2015 vs. 1994–2000  
As it is mentioned in Introduction, Gluschenko (2011) reports a spatial pattern of market integration 
in Russia in 1994–2000 relative to a benchmark region. It would be interesting to compare this with 
the pattern obtained for 2001–2015. Unfortunately, these two analyses are not fully comparable. 
First, they differ in data used. For 1994–2000, the cost of a staples basket consisting of 25 
foods has been analyzed, while the 33-food basket is used here. The difference is not only in the 
number of goods, but also in their quantities across the baskets. Besides, the price data for 1994–
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2000 are those collected in capital cities of regions, whereas the data for 2001–2015 are regional 
averages (to be exact, averages over cities/towns where prices are being observed by the official 
statistics in a given region). At last, the 1994–2000 analysis covers 75 regions (2775 region pairs); it 
does not include the Moscow and Leningrad oblasts, Ingushetia, and Chukotka. 
Second, the analyses differ in methodology. The analysis for 1994–2000 uses a benchmark 
region, exploits the general-to-specific approach, and classes conditionally integrated region pairs as 
non-integrated (since most price disparities were so great that could not be assigned to transportation 
costs only). However, Table A2 in Gluschenko (2011) reports results of estimation across all region 
pairs, using these to select the ‘best’ benchmark region.2 Besides, benefiting from unpublished 
intermediate results of the 1994–2000 analysis, it is possible to distinguish conditionally integrated 
region pairs and restore results corresponding to the specific-to-general approach.  
Third, Gluschenko (2011) uses a different strategy of testing for unit roots (see Appendix for 
details). It makes it possible to reject unit roots more frequently than under the strategy applied in 
this study. For the sake of comparability, results for 2001–2015 have been reestimated with the use 
of the same unit root tests as in Gluschenko (2011).  
Table 3 compares summarized patterns obtained for 1994–2000 and 2001–2015 within the 
framework of both specific-to-general and general-to-specific approaches. Results for 2001–2015 
are those obtained under the same strategy of testing for unit roots as has been used for the 1994–
2000 analysis (actual results from Table 1 are in parentheses).    
   
Table 3. Comparison of integration patterns for 1994–2000 and 2001–2015, percentage of region 
pairs  
 
Group of region pairs Specific to general General to specific 
 1994–2000 2001–2015 1994–2000 2001–2015 
Perfectly integrated 54.7 26.8 (21.7)  25.8  8.6 (12.1) 
Conditionally integrated 29.2 44.6 (28.8)  32.6  30.7 (22.9) 
Tending towards integration 11.3 4.7 (4.2 ) 34.3  18.4 (11.0) 
Total  95.2 76.2 (54.7)  92.7  57.7 (46.0) 
Non-integrated 4.8 23.8 (45.3)  7.3  42.3 (54.0) 
   Out of these, diverging 1.1 11.0 (9.7)  3.6  29.5 (18.4) 
 
There is a great difference between the periods of 1994–2000 and 2001–2015. Prior to 1992, 
the overwhelming part of consumer prices in Russia was centrally-fixed; in January 1992, they were 
liberalized (decontrolled). However, no market institutions existed by that time; the wholesale trade 
                                                          
2 It is worth noting that the Saratov Oblast was chosen, as it generated the greatest number of integrated region pairs. In 
2001–2015, this region turns out to be the third ‘worst.’ This is one more argument against the benchmark approach. 
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and the most part of retail trade were state-owned. Such institutions were emerging during the early 
1990s due to mass privatization and market self-organization. As a result, spatial goods arbitrage 
came into play since about 1994. Beginning in that year, improvement in integration of Russia’s 
regional market was observed. The period of 1994–2000 was that of further transition from 
centrally-planned to market economy; ‘artificial’ barriers to inter-regional trade becoming 
progressively lowered (Gluschenko, 2010). In 2001–2015, by contrast, the Russian economy was 
functioning as a market one. At least, there were no fundamental differences in the functioning of 
markets for consumer goods in Russia and long-standing market economies. 
Therefore, one would expect integration in 1994–2000 to be poorer than in 2001–2015 (with a 
greater number of region pairs tending towards integration). Surprisingly, this is not the case. The 
‘integration rate’ in 1994–2000 is significantly higher, exceeding 90% under both approaches. The 
use of the general-to-specific approach decreases the ‘integration rate’ by only 2.5 percent points. If 
this approach would be applied to obtain the 2001–2015 pattern, the ‘integration rate’ dropped by 
18.5 percent points, to 58%. As expected, the share of region pairs tending towards integration is 
greater in 1994–2000. However, this is not the reason for higher ‘integration rate;’ the share of 
perfectly and conditionally integrated pairs is also greater in 1994–2000: 86.6% as compared to 
71.4% in 2001–2015 (58.4% vs. 39.3%, respectively, under the general-to-specific approach). The 
most unexpected feature is widespread perfect integration in 1994–2000. The percentage of 
perfectly integrated pairs in that period is twice (or even three times) as much as in 2001–2015. The 
cases of price divergence were rare in 1994–2000. In the next period, their number dramatically 
increased, up to almost one third, if additional 18.5% of region pairs exhibiting weak divergence 
trends (revealed by the general-to-specific approach) were taken into consideration. 
Possibly, unexpected features in the difference between the 1994–2000 and 2001–2015 
patterns can be partially explained by the difference in the data. If the cost of the staples basket with 
a wider coverage of goods and cities were used for 1994–2000, the integration pattern would 
become worse. Gluschenko (2009, Figures 5 and 6) provides an indirect confirmation of this 
hypothesis. The degree of market segmentation estimated with the use of the 33-staples basket is 
higher than that estimated with the use of the 25-staples basket. One more hypothetical reason is the 
effect of the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. It caused structural breaks in many time series of price 
differentials; the breaks were distributed over August 1998 through January 1999. Thus, the after-
break time span is rather short, containing 22 to 29 points in time. This would have prevented 
revealing actual behavior of price differentials after the break that differed significantly from the 
‘pre-break’ behavior, overstating the ‘integration rate.’  
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However, these factors could provide only partial explanation. In general, reasons of poorer 
integration in 2001–2015 as compared with 1994–2000 are unclear. This relates specifically to the 
disintegration tendency stretching over more than a tenth of region pairs in 2001–2015. More 
detailed and deeper study is needed to explain reasons behind the obtained pattern of market 
integration. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using the cost of the basket of 33 basic food goods as the price representative, the spatial pattern of 
market integration in Russia in 2001–2015 was analyzed. It was found that about 71% of region 
pairs in Russia could be deemed integrated or conditionally integrated, and about 5% could be 
classified as tending towards integration with each other. An unpleasant feature in the pattern 
obtained is a significant share (11%) of region pairs inclined to disintegration, i.e. exhibiting price 
divergence.  
There are a number of poorly integrated regions in the European part of Russia. This seems 
strange from the viewpoint of their favorable geographical positions. Intuitive considerations 
suggest that market integration in Russia in 2001–2015 should be stronger than in 1994–2000, when 
transition from centrally-planed to market economy was in progress. Surprisingly, this has not been 
confirmed. Further research has to find explanation of this fact as well as reasons for 
incomprehensible features of the pattern obtained.  
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Appendix. Technical details of unit root testing 
For testing the unit root hypotheses, H0: λ = 0 (against λ < 0), the t-statistic of λ is used, τ = λ/σλ 
(because of the nonstandard distributions, it is denoted τ , and not t). Two tests employed take 
account of possible autocorrelation of a form other than AR(1), the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test and Phillips-Perron test.  
The ADF test uses an auxiliary regression which includes additional lags of the dependent 
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variable. A modified Bayesian (Schwarz) information criterion with a sample-dependent penalty 
factor serves for choosing the optimal lag length. This modification is due to Ng and Perron (2001), 
who note that the ‘ordinary’ information criteria tend to select lag lengths that are generally too 
small for unit root tests to have good sizes. The lag length varies in the auxiliary regressions from 0 
to Kmax = [12(T/100)1/4], where [⋅] stands for integer part. At the same time, the number of effective 
observations is fixed (according to Ng and Perron, 2005), equaling T – 1 – Kmax. Then the 
reestimation of auxiliary regression with the optimal number of lags and actual number of 
observations yields the adjusted value of λ and, in turn, τ. Note that the auxiliary regression is 
merely technical: it is used only for obtaining adjusted value ofτ. The estimates of λ and other 
regression parameters should be taken from the original regression.  
In contrast to the ADF test, the Phillips-Perron test adjusts values of σλ rather than λ. It is 
known that the Phillips-Perron test may suffer from size distortions. As Perron and Ng (1996) find, 
this may be avoided with the use of an autoregressive spectral density estimator instead of kernel-
based estimators. Therefore, the OLS (not-detrended) autoregressive spectral method is applied in 
this study. In doing so, the lag length selection method is the same as described above for the ADF 
test.  
Gluschenko (2011) uses a different strategy of testing for unit roots. First, he applies the 
‘ordinary’ Bayesian (Schwarz) information criterion for selection of lag lengths in the ADF test. 
Second, he employs the Phillips-Perron test based on the Bartlett spectral kernel. Under such a 
strategy, the unit root tests more frequently reject nonstationarity than those used in this study.  
Although distributions of the test statistic τ are nonstandard, they are documented in the 
literature (e.g., MacKinnon, 1996) for the cases of Equations (1) and (2) as well as for equations 
with linear and quadratic trends. These distributions (known as the Dickey-Fuller distributions) are a 
built-in tool of different econometric packages. As for Equation (3) with different nonlinear trends, 
there are no ready-to-use distributions. To derive them, the empirical distributions of τ under the 
null hypothesis of random walk have been estimated with the use of the Monte Carlo method with 
1,000,000 replications. Table A1 reports selected critical values of the τ-statistics for equations with 
trends, (3a)–(3c), and sample size T = 180. Figure A1 plots the 10-percent tails of the distributions, 
comparing them with the Dickey-Fuller distributions for the cases of linear and quadratic trends. 
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Table A1. Selected critical values of the unit root test τ-statistics for Equation (3) 
  
Significance  
level 
Log-exponential 
trend (8a) 
Exponential 
trend (8b) 
Fractional trend 
(8c) 
0.1% –4.528 –4.463 –6.616 
1% –3.848 –3.865 –5.162 
5% –3.230 –3.279 –3.825 
10% –2.908 –2.974 –3.302 
20% –2.522 –2.614 –2.796 
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Figure A1. Distributions of τ-statistics for Equation (3) and selected Dickey-Fuller distributions. 
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